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A compilation of thirty-two chapters, thirty-one of which have been previously published, 
Edith Wyschogrod’s Crossover Queries: Dwelling with Negatives, Embodying Philosophy’s Oth-
ers is a tour de force of scholarly work dating back to 1980. Resolutely adroit, Wyschogrod 
repeatedly underscores decades of study and thoughtful encounter with the so-called 
postmodern condition with the skill of a surgeon whose craft is nothing less than a matter 
of mortality. It should come as no surprise to those who have read Wyschogrod that her 
analysis cuts between technical prose and stunning clarification that comes from treating 
some of philosophy and theology’s most profound questions.  
The text is divided into seven major sections, with topics like “nihilation and the eth-
ics of alterity,” “training bodies: pedagogies of pain,” “the art in ethics,” and “God: desiring 
the infinite” (vii-viii). It would be of disservice to attempt a generalized summary in such a 
short space—Wyschogrod describes her work in similar ways: “I have tried not to draw a 
map that, in postmodern language, precedes the territory but rather to move from island to 
island in an archipelago of concepts” (10)—but rather my approach to understanding this 
tome, as a whole, is vis-à-vis stitching together many disparate themes that, craftily, come 
together in a rather enthralling way. One should not, however, mistake Wyschogrod’s care-
ful methodology, which she measures from the outset:  
 
[…] the risks and ambiguities, the unstable concatenations of contemporary thought as man-
ifested in many and varied contexts – in the desire for transcendence and in meanings as-
cribed to corporeality, in critical dilemmas of ethical existence and in the status of philosoph-
ical inquiry itself – will be explored as expressions of negation loosely linked in a nexus of 
crossings (1).  
 
To borrow language from one of her interlocutors, Wyschogrod’s gift to the field is found in 
her sustained and rigorous encounter with such figures as Foucault, Derrida, Lyotard, and, 
most especially, Levinas, amongst many others. For in the latter, Wyschogrod is on equal 
footing in a 1982 interview where she probes with such sustained and pointed questions, 
ending with interrogatories like, “Haven’t you then really returned to the roots of Western 
philosophy? How can you avoid entangling ethics in ontology?” (284). Like all postmodern 
gifts, however, there is that of anticipation, of expected reciprocity; what Wyschogrod’s text 
requires of the reader, then, is a recasting of chronoexpectation: “Is human existence not 
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torn between the impetus to get on with it, to be rid of the ball and chain of Nachträglichkeit, 
of what comes later, as Nietzsche advises, on the one hand and, on the other, the desire to 
speak for the dead, who cannot speak for themselves?” (250).  
Wyschogrod’s essays span the gamut of western and, to a lesser extent, eastern 
thought, with varied accounts on topics like opera, dance and choreography, genocide, vir-
tual worlds, eroticism, and bodily pain. Wyschogrod’s work is reminiscent of the most sto-
ried of thinkers: it is applicable not only across the humanities but also to an envisaging 
“for the viva vox of events both recent and long past, the recovery of the texture of things in 
all their Leibhaftigkeit, their living presence, even as they drift away” (345). Perhaps in their 
relentless and unwavering clarity, Wyschogrod’s questions in interviews with Levinas, 
John D. Caputo, and Carl Raschke stand apart from her other essays. Her exchanges bring 
out such riveting insights as Caputo’s statement, “But you want to invoke a non-Freudian 
eros, after Freud – or even before Freud, in Plato – whom you cite, where eros, taken in a 
wider sense, incites a desire for the Forms, first of all for the Beautiful, but eventually for 
the Good. In that sense, the desire for God has an erotic component” (304). Or, in the same 
interview (again Caputo): “There is nothing outside the text and there is nothing outside 
the image, not in the sense that there is nothing real but in the sense that nothing comes 
naked and unmediated, untouched by text or image” (313). Wyschogrod’s theological en-
counter with Raschke is no less interesting; for example: “A truly ‘radical’ form of ortho-
doxy would take up the challenge of what you would call ‘aestheticization,’ because the 
faith of Calvary, as opposed to some kind of pseudo-Johannine conjunctio oppositorum, re-
quires it” (319).   
A recurring theme in Wyschogrod’s work is that of the ethical dimension(s) that 
shape, distort, inform, and transform contemporary life. The crises of the twentieth century 
extend their terrible tentacles of perversion into the new millennium; thus, the ethical ques-
tions that stem from such acts of horror deserve careful attention. One example is the capa-
bility and execution of genocide; within the nexus of unspeakable atrocity is what 
Wyschogrod calls the “warring logics of genocide” (222). This logic “is often justified by its 
perpetrators not principally on the grounds of what the dead are presumed to have done 
but rather as required by an ontological flaw, as it were, attributed to the victims” (222). 
Wyschogrod’s extended conversation with Levinas is especially helpful in her treatment of 
genocide, specifically in her understanding of il y a, because, “In its doubleness, the il y a 
refers both to the elemental, a terrain that lies escheat prior to the emergence of individual-
ism and the structures of human existence, and also, as we have seen, to Being as that into 
which the already-existing individual can sink” (231). In her interpretive prowess, 
Wyschogrod does not recoil from the difficult ethical quandaries that warp our world; in-
deed, there is an underlying hope, even an expectation, that engagement with the Other can 
have generative power of the good, “in order to illuminate the warring logics of genocide 
and the reversal of these logics that issues in the frisson of horror, the visceral response to 
the mass exterminations of the present age” (235).   
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Though Wyschogrod uses the language of the Other as many of her contemporaries 
do (especially Levinas, Lacan, and Derrida), and indeed it rightly functions as a way 
through the mire of such topics like genocide, it also leaves something unfinished in the 
final analysis. Does the Other ultimately function as a foil to avoid the real issue at hand? I 
might be criticized for my use of “function” here because the Other is comprehensible her-
meneutically as beyond function (this I acknowledge as possible) but I mean simply that the 
Other stands as a place marker for the space in which that-not-already or, in psychoanalytic 
terms, that-beyond-I, functions within and as the marked out, temporal apophatic linguistic 
tool. Contextualization of the Other in terms of the psychological position cuts across to that 
of the ethical position. Applied specifically to Wyschogrod’s methodology of marking out 
the space of the Other, I question phrasing in her analyses like, “The sphere of moral delib-
eration, the possibility for the discourse of justice, supervenes upon the primordial level of 
sheer exposure to the Other, where neither reciprocity nor deliberation is possible” (140) or 
engagement with the psychological language of Lacan: “The double meaning attributed to 
the Other is tied to the inevitability of human frustration and anguish” (85). And, the same 
for her analysis of Levinas: “the other person cannot be rendered as an object because she or 
he is the Other, always already given as uncontainable in thought, as an excess refractory to 
representation, or in Levinasian terms, as the Cartesian infinite, whose ideatum exceeds any 
idea we can have of it” (71, italics in original). Or, elsewhere: “Not only does the primitive 
appear as a human countenance and thus as Other, but also as one who is infra-historical, 
who is extruded from the totality, the institutional and material culture that is the subject of 
history” (499).  
My issue with use of the Other is not one of contextualization but of value(s). If the 
Other, ultimately, remains aloof from the intraethical mechanics of an argument, how can it 
have value from within? Perhaps this truly is the function aforementioned: to remain entire-
ly outside the argument. The problem here is within the so-called postmodern condition; 
the Other is a lynchpin remaining valueless within the hermeneutics that Wyschogrod 
wants to argue have very real value. This aloofness, then, undermines some key points be-
cause as a contextual foil it functions to suspend the values but does not allow for real ac-
tion that such ethical quandaries demand. To illustrate with a prior example, Wyschogrod’s 
treatment of genocide marks out a space “for a Good that mandates responsibility for the 
Other. As the expression of divine transcendence, the infinite releases the moral revulsion 
that is the common response to genocide” (235). Wyschogrod’s argument here, like other 
ethical discussions, engages with very real problems; few would argue with the necessity of 
undermining the damning logic of genocidal killing. The Other presupposes that there is 
still an ‘Other’ outside of the self; the problem when applied to realities as horrifying as 
genocide is if the demarcation of the Other, as a placeholder of ethical responsibility, goes 
far enough in the reality of militant boots on the ground and bullets flying overhead. Not 
that the Other in Wyschogrodian, Derridean, Lacanian, or Levinasian ethical discourse is a 
crutch to skirt the real issues but that perhaps the hermeneutic does not extend as far as it 
might. Perhaps the power of the Other is not as a place holder but as the raison d’etre for 
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concrete action. Wyschogrod’s analysis throughout this tome approaches this very point 
but does not, at least in my reading, carry through with the very real socio-political demand 
for action.  
This collection contains some of Wyschogrod’s most insightful and challenging 
work. I specifically say challenging because it is well-suited for those with an in-depth un-
derstanding of the postmodern world in which Wyschogrod wrote; it is a specialists’ text 
but also serves as an excellent primer to her scholarly contributions. As a reader, I found 
myself intrigued with not only the breadth of topics covered but also the skill by which 
Wyschogrod penetrates some of the problems faced in our time. This is a valuable collection 
of work, and will, I am sure, provoke scholarly discussion in the future.  
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